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Introduction
Most of the scenarios begin the same, a plane lands or a cruise ship
docks in the U.S. from an exotic country suffering at the outset of an epidemic
of influenza. The passengers have been exposed but have no outward
symptoms until the next day, two days or week later. By that time they have
infected most of the people they have come in contact with and a vicious
cycle of illness rapidly crosses the country. The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention have anticipated the occurrence of the particular strain of flu
rampaging across the country, but the companies supplying the vaccine are
having trouble replicating the virus in sufficient quantities and in a timely
fashion. Faced with dramatic shortfalls in vaccine quantity and a near
panicked public, local governments must decide who gets the limited vaccine
available in order to maintain some semblance of order. Vaccine already
shipped to unscrupulous "middleman" distributors leads to a dramatic rise in
the price of the vaccine, and the manufacturers follow suit. "Black Market"
vaccine sells without any control over whether the product is even genuine or
unadulterated. Empty vaccine bottles are refilled with tap water and sold to
high bidders and even health care facilities. A few states have control over
vaccine distribution and a well thought out plan. Even so, only the most likely
to suffer severe effects from the influenza and the direct caregivers
themselves can be vaccinated. A vast number of the population is gravely sick
and catastrophic numbers of lives are lost leaving the governmental
infrastructure withered. From the most mundane of activities such as garbage
pick up to grave digging, the loss of manpower leaves cities crippled. Fires,
looting and riots break out and a mass migration from cities to outlying areas
in search of food, medical attention and safety leave whole areas of the
country abandoned and in ruin.
This scenario has been played out in the past, though not to the
modern extreme depicted above.
Influenza like disease has occurred throughout history, with as many as
31 possible pandemics. A pandemic is defined as a worldwide occurrence of
an illness clearly in excess of normal expectancy. This is an expansion of
another epidemiological term, epidemic. An epidemic is an outbreak of illness
in clear excess or normal expectancy in a region, community or group, smaller
than a worldwide population. The influenza (flu) pandemic of 1918 is
estimated by the CDC to have killed 500,000 in a span of approximately eight
months, in the United States alone. The particular strain of influenza virus
was especially virulent. Adults who were otherwise healthy in the morning
may have been dead by nighttime. Another strain of flu in 1957, known as
the Asian Flu, killed almost 70,000 of the more susceptible people in the
population, the young and the elderly. The Asian flu was identified early and
the population partially vaccinated against it.
The 1968 Hong Kong Flu is rated as the "mildest" pandemic of this
century. Antibiotics and the timing of the outbreak were credited with the
reduction in severity. "Only" 34,000 people died of this strain in the U.S..
Other scares have come and gone in recent years. Rapid dissemination of
"news" appears to have played a part in labeling outbreaks as potential
pandemics. Thus far, another pandemic has not arisen.
Influenza is an acute upper respiratory infection that is largely self-
limiting. Flu is associated with causing complications in patients with
underlying cardiac and pulmonary conditions, the very young, and those over
65 years of age, but the virus is such a potent threat to humans due to its
ability to infect all age groups.
It is also particularly virulent due to its own make up, its high degree of
transmissibility and attack rate, a reservoir of virus in aquatic bird species,
and the viruses own ability to drift and mutate rapidly. Influenza viruses
naturally mutate themselves in two fashions; one is gradual evolution, known
as drift, the other is rapid surface protein change known as antigenic shifts. It
is these shifts which result in new subtypes of the virus. Pandemics occur
when there is an antigenic shift in the influenza A virus to a new subtype that
the general public has not been exposed to, leaving them vulnerable to
infection.
Vaccination against influenza is available, in a typical year, to almost
anyone in the U.S. interested in getting the injectable vaccine. It’s cost
effectiveness has been estimated as producing an annual savings of $13.66
per person vaccinated.
It is advised that anyone in one of the high risk groups, as outlined by
the CDC, get the vaccine. In the 2000/2001 influenza season, risk categories
were published as in chart 1.
CHART 1
Category
1
Groups at highest risk of influenza-related complications, including:
Persons 65 years of age or older
Residents of nursing homes and other chronic-care facilities that house
persons of any age who have chronic medical conditions
Adults and children who have chronic disorders of the pulmonary system,
e.g., emphysema, chronic bronchitis or asthma.
Adults and children who have chronic disorders of the cardiovascular
systems, e.g., congestive heart failure
Adults and children who have required regular medical follow-up or
hospitalization during the preceding year because of chronic metabolic
diseases (including diabetes and mellitus), renal dysfunction,
hemoglobinopathies, (e.g. sickle cell disease), or immunosuppression (e.g.
caused by medications or HIV).
Children aged 6 months to 18 years who are receiving long-term aspirin
therapy and therefore might be at risk for developing Reye syndrome after
influenza injection
Women who will be in the second or third trimester of pregnancy during
the influenza season.
Persons who can transmit influenza virus to persons in category 1 because they
provide direct care, including:
Physicians, nurses, nursing assistants, orderlies, pharmacists, public safety
workers, emergency response workers, laboratory staff, health care
students, housekeeping staff and other staff in hospital and outpatient
settings who have direct patient contact.
Employees of nursing homes and chronic-care facilities who have direct
contact with patients or residents.
Employees of assisted living and other residences for persons in high risk
groups who provide direct care.
Providers of home care to people at high risk (e.g., visiting nurses and
volunteer workers).
Household members (including children) of persons in high risk groups.
Otherwise healthy persons aged 6 months and older who wish to reduce their
likelihood of becoming ill with influenza, such as:
Students and other persons in institutional settings (e.g., college students
in dormitories)
Employees of health care facilities who do not provide direct patient care.
Persons who provide essential community services
Work site clinics
Others.
Category
2
Category
3
Influenza vaccine was developed more than 50 years ago and has been
the primary flu prevention and control tool ever since. Influenza strains are
monitored by the World Health Organization (WHO) throughout the year and
particular strains are chosen by the spring of that year. The three licensed
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manufacturers of vaccine produce 70-80 million doses per year.
Approximately 90% of the vaccine is administered through the private
sector. 16
Influenza vaccine is produced by growing viruses in embryonated
chicken eggs. The virus is purified and inactivated and then the concentration
adjusted against reference standards. It can take up to 8 months to
produce enough vaccine for the population. In the event of a pandemic
influenza crisis, severe shortages of vaccine are anticipated. Shortages may
occur due to inefficacy of the vaccine developed, and / or the potentially
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sudden appearance of an unpredicted strain.
Under-vaccination of the population would also create conditions ripe
for an influenza epidemic. Enough of the population must be vaccinated to
induce what is known as herd immunity. Herd immunity is roughly defined as
that proportion of the population which much be immunized to reduce to a
minimum the likelihood that an non-immunized person will encounter a source
of infection. For influenza, that would be another non-immunized person.
Vaccination does not protect, necessarily, the one who is immunized against
influenza, as the vaccine is not 100% protective against influenza, but it
reduces to an acceptable probability an outbreak of influenza. Every disease
has a different herd immunity threshold. Measles for example has been
estimated at 94% vaccination rate to effectively invoke herd immunity. The
Healthy Persons 2000 strategy noted in many journal articles suggests a
minimum of 60% of the high risk population must be vaccinated against
influenza for herd immunity to begin to be effective.
Studies of those receiving the vaccine show disparities among races in
the United States.s Reasons for the disparity appear to range amongst
acculturation, lack of health insurance, poverty, lack of education and a lack of
community support. Based on the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
data from 1996 only 47% of blacks were vaccinated against influenza
compared to about 68% of whites. The authors of the study hypothesized
intervention aimed at all groups would benefit in greater vaccination rates,
thereby increasing the herd immunity within each group as it interacts within
itself and other groups.
The 2000 2001 flu season began with discussion of it becoming a
pandemic. The hypothetical scenario at the start of this paper did not
appear to be too far off with regards to the manufacturers having difficulty
preparing sufficient quantity of vaccine. Two issues were identified in the
shortages. The Food and Drug Administration had levied violations on two
manufacturers and all the manufacturers had difficulties in developing enough
vaccine. The difficulty experienced in the 2000-2001 flu season provided a
unique opportunity for public and private entities to focus attention on the
problems with the national influenza vaccine manufacturing and delivery
system.
Influenza related deaths in a typical year average 10,000 to 40,000
persons. Hospitalizations average approximately 50,000 to 300,000 patients
per year.3 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates
that a pandemic of 1918 proportion would result in up to 300,000 dead from
flu and as many as 100,000,000 clinically ill.3
The pandemic planning was revisited by the CDC and WHO in 1993 in
an effort to revise a plan originally devised in 1978. The panel, convened in
the U.S., reasserted that "State and local healthjurisdictions willplay critical
roles implementing the nationalplan andshould activelyparticipate in the
planning process. "33 Response to an influenza pandemic falls primarily on
State and local authority. The CDC estimates that most jurisdictions do not
yet have sufficient plans in place.3
As part of an on-going strategy for preparedness for the next
pandemic, the CDC has identified a need for improving readiness and
decreasing the time required to mount a response to a pandemic as well as
developing flexible contingency plans for the distribution of vaccine.3s The
CDC urges that "mechanisms must be in place far in advance ofthe
pandemic.., to reallocate and redistribute unused vaccine promptly and
eftcientl’. A crucial element to a pandemic plan is developing policies for
the distribution of flu vaccine to the entire population in priority order.
The WHO feels pandemic planning must accomplish two main
objectives. One is effective risk assessment of the new virus. The second is
risk management, not as it may refer to preventing a pandemic, but
management of available resources in reducing the overall effects of a
pandemic. Pandemic response must be flexible enough to allow for rapid
change, even in the target groups that are to receive the vaccine
The WHO suggests a central clearinghouse where cooperating
countries can pool vaccine purchases. Each government and vaccine
supplier will need to consider how much vaccine they will guarantee to
purchase or sell in an emergency situation. Without a "clearinghouse" to
balance demand and supply, cost considerations rather than public health may
drive vaccine distribution needs. Security problems may develop during
pandemic situations. Strict accountability on the part of the clearinghouse,
the manufacturers, and the distributors must be enforced. This approach may
be downsized to meet the needs of smaller governing bodies, such as States,
Counties, or local health departments.
Statement of the problem
Mass immunization of the population against communicable disease is
an obvious Public Health function. Mechanisms for obtaining the necessary
doses and delivering them to the areas most in need during either an
epidemic event or routine inoculation of the general public are in place
throughout the United States. There is little government control over
influenza vaccine manufacture and distribution. This is in stark contrast to
most childhood vaccines which are distributed by governmental health
agencies.
Millions of U.S. citizens receive influenza vaccine each year. The
beginning of the 2000-2001 influenza season tested many of the mechanisms
in place in the tri-state region of Connecticut, New York, and Massachusetts.
Protocols were altered by the CDC in response to the apparent shortages
triggered by slow viral response to laboratory growth and actions taken
against the drug companies by the FDA. The CDC posted its
recommendations and expected them to be followed in an effort to vaccinate
those most in need of protection first. This left much of the population, used
to getting their annual vaccination, without a source of vaccine. Early in the
so called crisis, stories circulated of large companies mass immunizing their
staff, using up thousands of doses of scarce vaccine while nursing homes and
the elderly remained unvaccinated. s The question arose, "how can they get
vaccine when the department of public health has not even received theirs
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yet?" Agencies began to look over their procurement policies, but orders had
already been made months in advance. Some agencies ran out due to partial
shipment of their ordered vaccine while others waited for weeks beyond their
delivery date without any vaccine at all. Some agencies had just the opposite
problem" they had received their allotted doses, ran their clinics but now had
excess. This excess was not an uncommon occurrence, as it is better to be
"safe than sorry". Excess was always returnable up to 10% of the order in
the past; however, this year the manufactures were not taking any vaccine
back for credit. Excess vaccine was often discarded unused while the
neighboring state or county went without.
As an example of the cost of vaccine and how it can spiral upwards
even in a "non-pandemic" situation, in the 1999-2000 flu season vaccine cost
$25.00 per 10 dose vial. At the start of the 2000-2001 flu season, the same
10 dose vial cost $50.00. The cost then jumped to $140.00 per 10 dose vial
at the peak of the 2000-2001 season.
As noted earlier in this paper, pandemic planning is not new. Plans are
still in the early stages of development or just newly completed but not fully
disseminated or implemented. Without these plans in effect an influenza
pandemic might be difficult to manage as efficiently as in a time when the
plans were accepted and in effect. The 2000-2001 influenza season had all
the makings of a young pandemic. Luckily, it never materialized. Public
health officials were scrambling to adopt some sort of plan to immunize the
public. Protocols for who should be vaccinated had been set by the WHO and
CDC. How the vaccine was to get to its intended targets was not clear.
This paper will attempt to analyze how selected areas in the tri-state
region obtained their influenza vaccine for public mass immunizations, how
those involved in procuring influenza vaccine felt about their current system,
and if improvements could be made in an effort to avoid shortages and some
of the confusion observed during the 2000-2001 influenza season. A
refinement to the current system used in Connecticut will be proposed which
may have implications beyond influenza vaccine.
September 11, 2001 saw the beginnings of a new era in pandemic
planning. Although beyond the original scope of this paper, it is hoped that
protocols suggested through the analysis of influenza vaccine distribution may
have effects on how any vaccine intended for the general public may be
disseminated and then redistributed to areas in need. Bioterrorism is not new
to this world, but is only now being forced onto the American public. A
deliberate epidemic will be combated with the same protocols as the perennial
biologic threat, Influenza.
Materials and Methods;
A questionnaire was developed for use via e-mail. The questionnaire is
an interactive document meant to be filled out immediately while the
document is still on the computer screen. It was thought this method would
increase responses. About half of the respondents utilized this method, but
an equal number filled out the questionnaire manually and faxed their
responses back.
A total of eight drafts of the questionnaire were developed. Staff
members of Sickness Prevention Achieved Through Regional Collaboration
(SPARC) and the immunization program at the Torrington Area Health district
reviewed the drafts of the questionnaire and suggested revisions. The first
and longest draft consisted of 23 questions. The questions ranged from
asking the source of vaccine to questions on who should be vaccinated. This
shotgun approach was found to be awkward on test subjects and required too
much "ll in the blanks" to be convenient.
Versions of the questionnaire were distributed to the SPARC and
immunization program staff at the Torrington Area Health district and Dr.
Timothy Morse PhD., the faculty advisor for this project. Also asked to
participate in the review was one of the office assistants at the Torrington
Area Health District. Her input was valuable because she was not part of the
development of the questionnaire up to that point and therefore had insight
which was overlooked by those of us dealing with the development.
By version three, the questions had been "boiled down" to ten on-
target questions. It was felt that this number of questions was easier to
complete and most involved simply circling a choice of answer. The questions
now focused on where the respondent obtained their vaccine supply, how
much they get, why they order the number of doses they do, and how they
handle excess.
An important aspect of vaccine distribution was thought to be what
becomes of excess vaccine? Re-distribution of available stock to areas which
lack sufficient vaccine is a very important factor. Where vaccine overstock
was shipped was noted.
By version eight, most of the fill in the blanks had been replaced by
choices to be checked off in the appropriate box. The boxes became the on-
line check boxes which standardized the manual form and the on-line version.
Only one subjective question was left for the respondents. This question
asked for comment on two previous questions, "do you feel the current
method of procuring influenza vaccine is adequate?" and "how do you feel the
current system worked for 2000 / 2001 flu season?" One answer blank was
supplied for this two-part question.
The recipients were asked if vaccine was re-distributed to other
facilities or returned to the manufacturer and if so, how the transfer was
tracked. If the respondent checked "yes", they were then asked to elaborate.
The completed form was informally field tested on the SPARC agency
and the Torrington Area Health district personnel involved in influenza vaccine
distribution. Each member of the test group felt the questionnaire flowed well
and each completed the form and were thus the first respondents. See
appendix "A" for the final draft of the questionnaire.
In an effort to contact people directly involved in the distribution of the
influenza vaccine for use in public mass immunizations, a list of contacts was
obtained from the regional office of the Assistant Director of SPARC, Donna
DiMartino. The SPARC list was used to make telephone contacts and from
these contacts, the list was expanded to others in the distribution network in
the area of interest.
Distribution is defined as initiating orders or transfers of vaccine for use
in public mass immunizations or the physical handling of vaccine for a specific
group. (As the study progressed, it became clear that there was little transfer
of vaccine taking place, but the remainder of the definition was adhered to.)
The list grew as each person on the SPARC list who was contacted by
phone or e-mail gave another potential contact’s name. Telephone interviews
of local agency personnel also proved valuable. The number of people who
handle influenza vaccine distribution in the study area was relatively low,
although there are a tremendous number of volunteers and behind-the-scene
people who coordinate clinics, set up clinics, and vaccinate the general public.
When inadvertently contacted, the people who work the clinics would
invariably supply a name already on the recipient list. This information helped
determine the study group had been found in its entirety.
Results, Connecticut Study Area
Connecticut presented with a specific difficulty in obtaining subjects for
the questionnaire. The questionnaire was limited to personnel thought to be
in charge of the distribution of the vaccine to public mass immunization clinics
within their specific group based on the information obtained from the
contacts supplied by SPARC. Seven people were contacted in Connecticut as
potential handlers of influenza vaccine within the study area. This number
does not represent everyone who handles influenza vaccine in Litchfield
County, there are dozens of people, especially in the private sector, in
Connecticut who participate in the distribution of flu vaccine. Due to the
current system of procurement, any properly licensed individual or agency
wishing to vaccinate the public against flu can go directly to the manufacturer
or any other distributor and purchase the vaccine. It has been estimated that
90% of adult flu immunizations in Connecticut are given through the private
sector.47
Of the seven Litchfield County contacts, two (29%) were recipients of
original drafts of the questionnaire. Due to the small number of contacts
within each region, the survey created its own "case definition" of a contact as
well as those who might have turned out to be exclusions from the study. By
not responding, the person was excluded from the study. Respondents self-
describing themselves as not involved in the process of distributing influenza
vaccine would not included either. In Connecticut, three of the seven
respondents (43%) did not participate in vaccine distribution, but they were
responsible for either tracking vaccine throughout the area or were part of the
Connecticut Department of Health responsible for initiating the state contract
with the manufacturer.
The seven initial Litchfield County contacts were each told by telephone
or e-mail about this project and asked to fill out a questionnaire. All seven
expressed an interest in the project and were given a form to fill out. Six
responses were received, an 86% response rate. Of the six, four were
determined to be "distributors of vaccine" based on the definition (66% of
final recipients in the study area).
Influenza vaccine in the Connecticut study area is obtained from many
different sources. Of the check boxes available, manufacturer direct,
wholesale suppliers, local health departments, VNA,and hospital pharmacy
were all noted as sources. "Other" was checked by the questionnaire author
in one case because the respondent filled in the "other" narrative space but
did not check any boxes (graph 1) It is important to note that a contact was
allowed to check more than one source of vaccine. Unfortunately, no method
of distinguishing what percentage of the vaccine obtained from each source
by each contact was devised. The check boxes were distributed equally
amongst the responses, each of the five choices noted above being checked
once, with one of the four qualifying contacts checking two separate boxes.
The Connecticut Department of Public Health does not purchase nor
distribute vaccine. The State contracts with the manufacturers as an
intermediary so local health departments and VNA can get discounts on their
orders. The health departments that offer vaccine and other agencies such as
the VNA must order directly from the manufacturer contracted with by the
State in order to get the discount or, alternately, are free to order from other
sources such as pharmaceutical vendors and wholesalers. Private physicians
must order from whatever private source they deem best for them, since the
State contract is not available for their use.
The amount of vaccine ordered is up to the person ordering. Past
trends, current predictions, and current case loads all dictate how much
vaccine a particular administrator in Connecticut will have on hand (graph 2).
When vaccine overstock is encountered in an agency the overstock is
handled in many different ways. Five choices were given on the questionnaire
(see appendix A). Three choices dominated the responses in the Connecticut
study area. "Return to manufacturer/wholesaler", "sell to a third party", and
"discard" were the only choices indicated in the responses. The choices
"never had excess" and "call state authority" were not chosen by the study
group in Connecticut (graph 3). In 2000 the manufacturers refused returned
vaccine for credit, whereas in the past, up to 10% could be returned for
refund. It would appear from the responses that each agency has had
excesses in the past. This may be true because it has been far easier in the
past to return excess than to attempt ordering more vaccine.
Many health administrators appear to have a fear of running low on
vaccine. The clinic or agency which runs out of vaccine is at the mercy of the
manufacturer with regards to formulation of additional vaccine and the price.
Many respondents mentioned the price fluctuation later in the influenza
season. At any given time, the price could be up or down from contracted
prices by as much as 50%, according to some respondents.
All the Connecticut respondents thought the current method of vaccine
procurement was adequate (graph 4). Of the four respondents answering
how they felt the system worked for them in the 2000/2001 flu season, most
(75%) felt it was "satisfactory", while the remaining 25% felt it worked
"poorly". No one felt it worked "very well" (graph 5).
Open comments were received regarding the distribution of influenza
vaccine. A respondent suggested greater organization was needed while
another, along the same theme, suggested centralizing the vaccine
distribution either at the state level or regionally.
Prioritizing the recipients of the vaccine was also suggested. It was felt
that the general public is offered the influenza vaccine too early, and that the
high-risk recipients should be nearly completely immunized before the lower
risk recipients. It was pointed out that private physicians, nursing homes and
the like did not receive their vaccine orders until late in the flu season. These
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locations represent places where the high risk recipients are accessed and
therefore should be receiving their vaccine first. Private physicians do not
typically run clinics in Connecticut and therefore their orders are smaller than
the VNA or local health departments.
Redistribution of vaccine was included in the open response portion of
the form. Suggestions included returning unused vaccine to a centralized
location for redistribution to clinics in need. The American Lung Association of
Connecticut maintained a list of all the Influenza vaccination clinics. As calls
from clinics running low on vaccine began to come in, the ALA contacted
clinics that had completed their schedules and inquired about excess vaccine.
This informal method was credited with supplying those in need of vaccine
with enough to complete their schedules as well.
Lack of communication amongst those in need with those with excess
was mentioned several times as a shortcoming of the current system. All
track transfer of vaccine as required by law, and the issue was not the
transfers themselves, but to whom they should transfer vaccine. Without
knowing who was in short supply, a clinic with an excess may discard unused
vaccine not knowing shortages even exist.
Results, Massachusetts Study Area
Nine people in the Massachusetts area were deemed appropriate to be
contacted. Of the nine, five verbally felt they had the time or inclination to fill
out a form for the study. Three completed forms were returned, for a 33%
response rate. Follow up by phone of those who did not return forms proved
unsuccessful.
Public clinics in Massachusetts (those sponsored by local boards of
health or a Visiting Nurse Association) are able to obtain influenza vaccine
from a stockpile maintained by the Massachusetts Department of Public
Health. An allotment from the Massachusetts Department of Health
determines the number of doses delivered locally. The allotted doses are
based on the number of doses ordered by that health department or agency
the previous season. These doses can only be administered to category 1
recipients from the CDC protocols (see Chart). Clinics wishing to vaccinate the
general public or augment the supply issued them by the State, must
purchase the vaccine themselves. Of the clinics offering vaccine to the
general public which responded to the survey, most get theirs directly from
the manufacturer (graph 1). The State of Massachusetts has ordered 740,000
49doses of vaccine for the 2001-2002 flu season.
Any influenza vaccine left over from the scheduled clinics appears to be
discarded. In past years, excess vaccine was returned to the manufacturer.
In the 2000-2001 influenza season, this practice was discontinued by the
manufacturers. Clinics were forced to either discard unused doses or contact
the State for instructions. Some were able to sell unused vaccine to other
clinics in need (graph 3).
All the respondents in the public sector felt the system for obtaining
vaccine was inadequate and that the system functioned poorly for the 2000-
2001 influenza season. Cited as reasons for the inadequacy was the feeling
that if shortfalls in vaccine occurred during the clinics, ordering more vaccine
from the State was difficult. Some clinicians were told that prior to
augmenting their vaccine supply during the season, a demonstrated need had
to be established, defined as less than 100 doses left on hand. To wait until
that low a number of doses is in reserve may have meant that some clinics
would open and then be shut down after only 100 doses were administered.
This would most likely incite some ill feelings toward the clinicians from the
public.
Those in the private sector had the opposite response as those in the
public sector, they felt the system was adequate and that it worked very well
(graphs 4 and 5). It was reported that the private sector receives their
vaccine earlier because they paid more than the public sector. If the vaccine
was in fact delivered earlier to the private sector, that group would have good
reason to feel the system worked well. In fact, both a hospital administrator
and the public clinic operators voiced a need for their facility to be put at the
top of the distribution list.
Results, New York Study Area
Eight people were contacted in New York. Of the eight, only three met
the study definition. All three returned forms with valuable information, a
37% response rate. Although low in actual number, the response appeared to
include the key personnel involved in vaccine distribution for the New York
study area.
Most often, administrators of influenza vaccine at public clinics in New
York State purchase their vaccine directly from the manufacturer (graph 1)
through a State contract with the New York Department of Health. Like
Massachusetts, the vaccine is earmarked for the category 1 groups only, as
outlined by the CDC. The number of doses ordered is based almost
exclusively on past trends and current projections of potential disease (graph
When overstock occurs, all of the respondents checked that they
discarded excess vaccine. One respondent also indicated that vaccine is
returned or sold to a third party (graph 3). All of the respondents felt the
method of obtaining influenza vaccine was adequate (graph 4). Two of the
three respondents felt the system functioned satisfactorily for the 2000-2001
influenza season, although one respondent voted "poorly" with no explanation
put forward (graph 5).
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Respondents in New York felt that the system could be improved by
pooling the vaccine. Although this comment appeared with little further
explanation or methodology, their reasoning appeared to be so no particular
group went without vaccine. Splitting the order between more than one
manufacturer was suggested as a means of obtaining at least part of an
order. This would eliminate relying on only one manufacturer as the contract
dictates and having drastic shortfalls in supply due to manufacturing
difficulties as seen in the 2000-2001 influenza season.
It was also suggested that the restrictions on who gets the vaccine be
lifted. Limiting the recipients to the CDC priority list was restrictive to some
administrators. This suggestion was made by a group which apparently had
no shortages in supply, as did many of the other vaccine administrators.
Summary
There are three manufacturers of influenza vaccine: Aventis Pasteur
Maerieux, Wyeth Ayerest Lederle. These are for-profit pharmaceutical
companies who make a product which is in seasonal demand and sell it to
anyone wishing to pay their prices. Because there are three of them, there is
a certain amount of competition amongst them. Because they are for-profit
businesses, they are also the targets for criticism. They have been accused by
the responders in this survey of selling to the highest bidder and delivering
earlier to areas of larger orders for the greatest profit.
Each state handles ordering influenza vaccine pretty much the same.
Each state attempts to get the best price for the vaccine from any of the
companies. Once a contract is settled, the states then either take delivery of
the vaccine itself, or makes the contract available to agencies within the state
so each agency can then order what it needs. The agencies are on their own
to either supplement the state allocation, or, in the case of shortages,
augment their supply through contracts of their own.
Connecticut agencies in charge of vaccinating the public against
influenza are on their own to get the supplies necessary. The State provides a
contract number on which the various agencies can order vaccine from a
single manufacturer only. It does not supply the vaccine itself. The contract
allows for a "price break"s. An agency can supplement shortages or simply
handle the ordering on their own by buying direct from the manufacturer or
through private wholesalers.
Connecticut is different from the other two states surveyed in that it
does not have a strong county system. Litchfield County, the area from which
respondents were surveyed, has a fairly strong regional collaboration made up
of the regionalized health department, the Torrington Area Health District,
which covers eighteen communities in Litchfield County and SPARC.
It was interesting to note that the three respondents answering the
question if "they felt that the current system of vaccine procurement was
adequate", said yes and yet one still felt the system "worked" poorly. Most of
the respondents (75%) selecting an option on how they felt the system in
Connecticut worked selected "satisfactorily", however.
Massachusetts contracts with a manufacturer in a similar fashion to
Connecticut. The differences lie in what happens next. The Massachusetts
Department of Health bases the contracted number of doses on past trends.
It only orders the number necessary to vaccinate the category 1 groups as
outlined by the CDC. The Department of Health then distributes the vaccine
to the various county or regional distribution centers.
The local Boards of Health at the town level and other health agencies
like the VNA, receive from the distribution center that number of doses
allotted to them based on the previous years usage. This number is only to
include the category 1 groups, the vaccine is not to be used for vaccination of
the general public.
A local board of health that wants to run a clinic open to the general
population with no restrictions must purchase vaccine on their own.
Vaccination of the general public often involves payment to the agency for the
shot, which has been pointed out as a source of friction between care givers
and receivers. Many feel that public agencies are obligated to provide vaccine
via taxes, but in fact most local governments can not afford to purchase
vaccine without reimbursement of some kind.
The New York Department of Health also contracts with one of the
manufacturers and has allotments sent to the various county health
departments. The county health departments tend to vaccinate only the high-
risk population. The general population must go to a private physician or
public clinic.
The vaccine shortage scare of the 2000-2001 influenza season is long
since over and vaccination rates are now available from the CDC. The target
vaccination rate for high risk individuals noted in the Healthy Persons 2000
strategy of 60%st was in fact exceeded on average in the U.S. for the 2000-
2001 influenza season. Based on data collected and released for the period
January through June, for persons aged 65 years and over, the estimate of
influenza vaccinations was about 64.3% in 2001.s2 In this respect the system
ultimately succeeded although the recommended schedule of vaccination for a
typical year was delayed.
Conclusions"
In a post 9/11 time of heightened homeland security, the potential
inadequate supply and distribution of vaccine needed due to possible terrorist
activity dictates tighter control and accountability to ensure the public is
protected. Shifting control from the strict capitalist system to a more
centralized federal, state or regional distribution network would ensure that all
the population is equally served.
Vaccine manufacturers should be increased to minimize the potential
for shortages due to closure, for whatever reason, of one of the factories.
Increasing the number of manufacturers would also help with the economics
of vaccine production. With a number of producers to choose from, pricing
would be expected to come down. Perhaps an incentive program to those
companies capable of producing both high quality and high quantity of vaccine
could be set up. The government is not currently set up to deal with
manufacturing itself and a consideration of that possibility is beyond the scope
of this thesis.
The economics of vaccine production were never intended to be
studied as part of this project. It is certain that there are aspects of
production and distribution which have not been addressed. The study
vehicle developed was intended to study how vaccine reaches its intended
target population and attempt to develop an improved methodology. Further
study of the possibility of increasing production, the government’s involvement
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in production, and the entire economics of vaccine distribution is certainly
warranted.
Flu vaccine reaching the target population is at the core of this study.
The comparison of the three state systems, Connecticut, New York, and
Massachusetts allowed for three distinct systems of distribution to be
compared by those using the systems. The following is a protocol for
influenza and, potentially, other vaccines and prophylactic agents such as
Potassium Iodide. The premise of the protocol is to remove individual
agencies from procuring vaccines and agents but maintaining their roles in
final distribution to the public.
Central clearinghouses for vaccine distribution have been suggested by
the WHO and CDC. An accounting system for allocation of vaccine could be
developed such as exists in the State of Massachusetts. Resolutions put before
the American Medical Association in December of 2000 moved to place the
onus of control of distribution of influenza vaccine on government agencies.
The resolution requested that the central government "...develop a
mechanism to assure appropriate distribution ofinfluenza vaccine initially to
those providers, public andprivate, who will immunize the highest risk
individuals first, and then use the remainder to protect other members ofthe
public... 3
Creation of a clearinghouse for vaccine would only be effective if the
clearinghouse were able to order and take delivery of all the vaccine produced
31
by all the manufacturers and pool the entire lot. An oversight committee at
the federal level could review allocation of vaccine to each state. As each
state submits to the clearinghouse for its allotment, it will be given what it
needs for tier 1 recipients only, based on statistics already compiled from past
influenza seasons.
The clearinghouse system would function best if there were a mirror
clearinghouse in each state wishing to receive federal vaccine. The state
clearinghouse would function much the same as the federal one. State
clearinghouses would receive orders from regional distribution centers, such
as health districts or individual health departments. Those wishing to
vaccinate people would apply to the regional office for an allotment based on
past tier 1 vaccinations. Since the state office has received their allotment
based on the same numbers given to the federal clearinghouse, there should
be enough to go around. Excess vaccine is returned to the clearinghouse
immediately after the clinic and redistributed to any areas which saw an
increased need for vaccine.
Excess vaccine at the state level is returned to the federal
clearinghouse as needed to fill deficiencies throughout the nation. Once the
federal clearinghouse is satisfied the priority population has been vaccinated,
shipping of the remainder of the vaccine can commence. The federal
clearinghouse would allocate to the states, based on past need, their required
doses. The states would ship to any regional distribution clearinghouse that
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has expressed a desire to vaccinate the general public. This need is compiled
from requests from individual clinics and practitioners wishing to vaccinate the
general public.
Where vaccine is located at any one time is crucial. Tracking of
available vaccine could take place via Internet or other real-time electronic
means. Each recipient of vaccine would log in the amount of vaccine on hand
and keep a running tally of the amount used. The tracking would not only
enhance accountability, but may enhance the distribution of available vaccine.
As one district completes its immunizations, it’s surpluses would immediately
be known and a transfer order can be issued to send that surplus directly to
another district in need. This works both ways, as the district uses up its
allotment, that shortage would be immediately noted and the surplus from
another district transferred directly instead of going back to the clearinghouse.
The clearinghouse would manage all transfers and maintain the accounting.
In summary, individual clinics and practitioners would apply twice to
their regional clearinghouse. Once for their priority recipients, and again for
the remainder of the population. The state clearinghouse would then apply to
the federal clearinghouse for each of the two categories. The federal
clearinghouse ships to the state facility which then ships to the clinics. Excess
vaccine follows a reverse path until the country has vaccinated all their priority
patients. Shipping then proceeds for the remainder of the population to the
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states, which ship to the clinics. Excess is again returned to the state for
reallocation within the state, then back to the federal clearinghouse.
Smaller versions of this system could be implemented starting at the
state level. No single state should rely wholly on any single manufacturer.
The state could pool the vaccine and be the primary clearinghouse for its
regional districts. No longer would large privately owned facilities be able to
order vaccine for its employees while nearby elderly housing goes
unvaccinated. Private facilities wishing to vaccinate would apply to the state
just the same as a clinic or private practitioner. The private facility would
receive its allocation when the priority population has been vaccinated. The
remainder of the population would have to wait until the second round of
distribution.
Parallels have been suggested between the influenza distribution plan
suggested in this paper and the current methodology of distribution of
tuberculosis (TB) medications in the State of Connecticut. TB is an infectious
pulmonary disease which if left untreated has a 50% fatality rate. As with
influenza, it is inhaled by the patient and can be spread from person to person
especially in crowded conditions such as overcrowded urban settings and
prison populations. HIV is often associated closely with TB.
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In Connecticut, the State funds and provides the anti-tuberculosis
medications to hundreds of medical clinicians. It also provides for diagnostic
treatment and prevention services and case management and screening to
local health departments, prisons, convalescent and nursing homes, schools,
56universities and hospitals.
The similarities between the programs include the State having total
control over the distribution of the TB medications. TB cases are vigorously
tracked through the current program and needs are therefore predictable.
The methodology has proven very effective in the fight against TB. From
1986 to 1996 TB incidence decreased in Connecticut on average 2% per
57year.
A state run program of distribution of TB medications is a small-scale
example of how effective the suggested protocol for Influenza vaccine can be.
The applicability of the protocol to other infectious disease medications during
epidemic situations, naturally occurring or as a result of accidental or
malicious release of disease organisms should be closely studied.
APPENDIX 1
Final version of influenza vaccine distribution questionnaire
INFLUENZA VACCINE QUESTIONAIRE
PART OF AN M.P.H. THESIS PROJECT ON IMPROVING VACCINE
DISTRIBUTION DURING INFLUENZA PANDEMICS AND VACCINE
SHORTAGES
PLEASE COMPLETE AND RETURN TO:
TOM STANSFIELD R.S.
TORRINGTON AREA HEALTH DISTRICT
350 MAIN STREET
SUITE A
TORRINGTON, CT. 06790 ph. 860-489-0436 email tstansfield@tahd.org
Responder’ s Name Position Title
Address
Phone and/or email
Name and title of person responsible for ordering influenza vaccine (if different)
1. Please describe your role in vaccine distribution
2. Where / how do your get your vaccine?
[Manufacturer Direct
[-]VNA or similar
[-]Wholesale Supplier
[---]Local Pharmacist
[--’]Local Health Department
Other
[--]State Health Department
[-]Hospital Pharmacy
3. How much bulk vaccine do you get each year? Avg. # of Doses
4. What factors determine the quantity of vaccine you order? (check all that apply)
lPast trends
[--ICurrent case load of patients
[-"]Current data / projections
[--]Other
5. How do you handle excess vaccine? (check all that apply)
[-]Return to manufacturer wholesaler [--1Call State authority
M.D. etc)
[-Discard [--]Never had excess
[-]Sell to third party (hosp.
6. Do you track vaccine transfers? [’--]Yes [--]No If so, how?
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7. Do you feel the your current method of procuring influenza vaccine is adequate? [Yes [-No
8. How do you feel the your current system worked for 2000 2001 flu season? (check one)
I--]Poorly 11Satisfactory I---]
Very Well
9. Comment on questions 7 and or 8 AND what do you think could be done to improve the
distribution of influenza vaccine
10. Do you know to whom else should speak?
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation. Any Further comments, suggestions etc. are
always welcome.
Appendix 2
Flow Chart of Distribution
Manufacturers Manufacturers
Federal
Clearinghouse
Manufacturers
States States States States
Counties and Counties and Counties and
Recions Recions Recions
Local Sites, Local Sites Local Sites
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